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Introduction
Thanks Michael, it is great to be here at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.
I am delighted to see so many friends, former colleagues, and
especially former members of the Legal Adviser’s office both as
speakers and in the audience.
As many of you know, Dean Scharf and Paul Williams, both
alumni of the Legal Adviser’s office, edited an excellent book a few
years ago about the Office of the Legal Adviser, entitled “Shaping
Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis,” which included essays and
interviews by ten former Legal Advisers. 1 Michael and Paul gave me
an opportunity to reflect on my four eventful years as Legal Adviser
*

Partner, Arnold & Porter; Adjunct Senior Fellow in International and
National Security Law, Council on Foreign Relations. The author served as
Legal Adviser to the Department of State from 2005-2009 and as Senior
Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council, The White House, from 2001-2005. This article is an
adaption of a speech made at Case Western Reserve University Law School,
September 14, 2018. The author acknowledges Katelyn Horne, an associate
at Arnold & Porter, for her assistance in preparing the footnotes for these
remarks.

1.

See generally Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, SHAPING FOREIGN
POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010) (discussing all ten of the living
former U.S. State Department legal advisers’ accounts of the role that
international law played during the major crises on each of their watches).
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from 2005 to 2009. They also gave me my first paycheck after leaving
government, for which I am grateful.
I want to single out two other speakers for recognition. Todd
Buchwald, with whom I worked closely for all eight years while I was
NSC and State Department Legal Adviser, is one of the best lawyers
and public servants I have ever known. Whenever I needed
trustworthy advice on the knottiest of legal issues, I would turn to
Todd. His retirement earlier this year was a huge loss for the State
Department. And I want to recognize our other keynote speaker, Elisa
Massimino, who left Human Rights First earlier this year after
twenty-seven years, including ten years as President. Elisa would
meet with me regularly when I was Legal Adviser and we have
worked closely together for the last nine years. In my mind, she is a
model human rights advocate—calm, measured, and persuasive.
Elisa’s retirement earlier this year was an equal loss to the human
rights community. I want to applaud both Todd and Elisa for their
past service and to say I look forward to their future contributions.
As many of you know, two years ago in August 2016, I drafted a
statement of fifty former national security officials who had served in
Republican administrations in which we said that Donald Trump
lacks the “character, values, and experience to be President.” 2 Here
are a few quotations from the statement:
● “He weakens U.S. moral authority as the leader of the free
world. He appears to lack basic knowledge about and belief in
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. laws, and U.S. institutions…” 3
● “[H]e persistently compliments our adversaries and threatens
our allies and friends.” 4
● He continues to display an alarming ignorance of basic facts
of contemporary international politics. 5
● He is unable or unwilling to separate truth from falsehood. He
does not encourage conflicting views. He lacks self-control and
acts impetuously. He cannot tolerate personal criticism. 6

We concluded by saying that, “[W]e are convinced that he would
be a dangerous President and would put at risk our country’s national

2.

Donald B. Ayer et al., STATEMENT
OFFICIALS 1 (2016).

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 2.
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security and well-being.” 7 If elected, we said he would be “the most
reckless President in American history.” 8
From a national security perspective, the last twenty months of
President Trump’s presidency have been even worse than many of us
imagined. Rather than making the United States respected around the
world, President Trump has withdrawn from international
agreements, 9 launched destabilizing trade wars with China and
Europe, 10 criticized and undermined NATO, 11 picked fights with our
closest allies, 12 gutted our State Department, 13 stoked unnecessary
international controversies, 14 and praised dictators and authoritarian
leaders like Kim Jung Un and Vladimir Putin. 15 Rather than
7.

Id. at 1.

8.

Id. at 2.

9.

Hasan Dudar & Deirdre Shesgreen, Trump’s Long List of Global Trade
Deals, Agreements Exited or Renegotiated, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2018,
8:08 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/21/donaldtrump-foreign-policy-iran-nafta-russia-mexico-canada-trade/1732952002/
[https://perma.cc/5JNW-QEQX].

10.

See Zachary Basu, Steel, Soybeans and NAFTA 2.0: A Year of Trump’s
Trade Wars, AXIOS (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-tradewar-2018-china-europe-mexico-canada-nafta-1e2ef110-55c3-48d2-9ec381af22a70859.html [https://perma.cc/N5TM-69ZS] (“President Trump
thoroughly upended the global trading system in 2018, slapping tariffs on
billions of dollars’ worth of imports as he pledged to ‘put American first’
and renegotiate more favorable trade deals for the U.S. around the world”).

11.

Cf. Dan de Luce et al., Trump’s Shadow Hangs Over NATO, FOREIGN
POLICY (Jan. 29, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/
01/29/trumps-shadow-hangs-over-nato-transatlantic-alliance-europe-defensedeterrence-europe-mattis-jens-stoltenberg/[https://perma.cc/ XC2X-DFZJ]
(“And the president’s tone and words have planted serious doubts about
whether the United States will deliver in a crisis”).

12.

See John T. Bennett, Analysis: Trump Wanted a Fight. He Found One-with His Allies, ROLLCALL (Jun. 8, 2018, 12:26 PM) https://
www.rollcall.com/news/politics/analysis-trump-wanted-fight-found-oneallies [https://perma.cc/ EWX2-LRL2] (“If Trump was looking to pick a
fight, he succeeded”).

13.

See Robbie Gramer et al., How The Trump Administration Broke The State
POLICY
(July
31,
2017),
https://
Department,
FOREIGN
foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-the-trump-administration-broke-thestate-department/ [https://perma.cc/9GAQ-BLY7] (“A hostile White
House is slashing its budget, the rank and file are cut off from a detached
leader, and morale has plunged to historic lows”).

14.

Bennett, supra note 12.

15.

See Krishnadev Calamur, Why The President Praises Dictators, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2019/01/trumps-delight-for-putin-duterte-and-mussolini/579652/
[https://perma.cc/BL3D-VN5Z] (discussing Donald Trump’s encouragement
of authoritarian leaders).
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exercising American diplomatic and moral leadership, as past
Presidents have done, President Trump has isolated the United States
from the rest of the world more than at any point in history.
But what is the Trump administration’s approach to international
law and institutions?
As a candidate, Donald Trump famously attacked numerous
international agreements negotiated by his predecessors, including
NAFTA, TPP, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, and the Iran
deal. 16 In Trump’s view, each of these was the “worst deal” ever
negotiated. 17 Candidate Trump even criticized the “eggheads” who
negotiated the Geneva Conventions after he was told that the Geneva
Conventions prohibited torture. 18
Early in the Trump administration, my friend and former
colleague, Jack Goldsmith, wrote at Lawfare that “we are witnessing
the beginnings of the greatest presidential onslaught on international
law and international institutions in American history.” 19 For much
of the last eighteen months, I had thought this assessment was
exaggerated.
Although the President and his administration took
numerous policy actions with which I disagreed vigorously (such as
the travel ban, the trade wars, and the withdrawal from Paris and the
Iran agreements), none of them were really direct attacks on
international law and institutions.
One reason for this may have been that President Trump himself
did not have enough experience with international law and courts to
have strong views about them. Moreover, his initial senior national
security advisers—Rex Tillerson, Jim Mattis, and HR McMaster—
were not international law skeptics.
Far from encouraging the
President to attack international law, they apparently urged him to
comply with it. 20 And none of the administration’s national security
16.

Dudar & Shesgreen, supra note 9.

17.

See, e.g., Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on
(Nov.
9,
2016,
7:16
AM),
Shaky
Ground,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran-idUSKBN13
427E [https://perma.cc/V554-7FD2] (referring to the Iran Nuclear Deal as
such).

18.

Jane C. Timm, The 141 Stances Donald Trump Took During His White
House Bid, NBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.
nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/full-list-donald-trump-s-rapidlychanging-policy-positions-n547801 [https://perma.cc/N7Z3-ZSEA].

19.

Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Onslaught on International Law and
Institutions, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/trump-onslaught-international-law-and-institutions
[https://perma.cc/848Q-UYKC].

20.

See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Trump Gets the National Security Advisor
McMaster Tried to Prevent, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:59 PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-gets-the-national-security-adviser-
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lawyers entered the administration with a strong anti-international
law bias.
Perhaps as a result, despite numerous other controversial
international actions, for its first 18 months, the Trump
administration did not engage in direct attacks on international law
and institutions.
This approach may now be changing. With the appointment of
John Bolton as National Security Advisor in March, 21 the
administration appears to be taking a more aggressive approach.
Ambassador Bolton is well-known for his skepticism, if not hostility,
towards international law and international institutions. 22
Since
taking office, he has strongly criticized the International Criminal
Court and the International Court of Justice. 23 He personally
announced the closing of the PLO Office in Washington as well as the
United States’ withdrawal from the Treaty of Amity with Iran and
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. 24
The United States also announced that it would
mcmaster-tried-to-prevent
[http://perma.cc/TH35-W6X3]
(discussing
McMaster’s distance from Donald Trump’s involvement with Russia).
21.

Greg Jaffe & Josh Dawsey, Trump Names Former Ambassador John Bolton
as His New National Security Adviser, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump -namesformer-ambassador-john-bolton-as-his-new-national-securityadviser/2018/03/22/aa1d19e6-2e20-11e8-8ad6-fbc50284fce8_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.c498c2ade873 [https://perma.cc/EH7Y-93GT].

22.

Nomination of John R. Bolton: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of John R. Bolton, then
nominee for US Ambassador to U.N, “It is a big mistake for us to grant any
validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term
interest to do so--because, over the long term, the goal of those who think
that international law really means anything are those who want to
constrict the United States”).

23.

Owen Bowcott et al., John Bolton Threatens War Crimes Court with
Sanctions in Virulent Attack, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2018, 2:49 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/10/john-bolton-castigateicc-washington-speech [https://perma.cc/VP3B-MJAC]; Natasha Turak,
US Rejects International Court of Justice Ruling on Iran, Continuing its
Isolationist
Charge,
CNBC
(Oct.
2,
2018,
9:39
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/us-rejects-international-court-of-justiceruling-on-iran-continuing-its-isolationist-charge.html
[https://perma.cc/DZ7G-QV8M].

24.

Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Closure of the PLO Office in
Washington (Sept. 20, 2018) (on file with U.S. State Department Bureau of
Public Affairs); Roberta Rampton et al., U.S. Withdraws from International
Accords, Says U.N. World Court ‘Politicized’, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018, 1:35
PM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty/u-swithdraws-from-international-accords-says-u-n-world-court-politicizedidUSKCN1MD2CP [https://perma.cc/S9J9-FXHR].
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withdraw from the U.N. Human Rights Council. 25 These actions may
reflect the beginning of the “presidential onslaught on international
law and international institutions” that Jack Goldsmith predicted.26
In this essay, I will address the Trump administration’s approach
to international courts and tribunals, to treaties and international
agreements, and to international human rights.

International Courts and Tribunals
Let me start with the Trump administration’s approach to
international courts and tribunals, starting with the International
Criminal Court, which was the principal subject of Ambassador
Bolton’s speech on September 10. 27
The International Criminal Court (ICC)

As most of you know, the U.S. Government has had a turbulent
relationship with the ICC. During the Clinton administration, the
United States participated actively in the negotiations of the Rome
Statute, the treaty that created the ICC, but ultimately voted against
the final text because of concerns that the treaty lacked sufficient
safeguards against politically motivated investigations of Americans.28
Although President Clinton ultimately authorized U.S. negotiators to
sign the treaty, he said that the U.S. would not submit it to the
Senate for approval until U.S. concerns were addressed. 29 In its first
term, the Bush administration adopted a hostile approach towards
the ICC. Ambassador Bolton, when he was Under Secretary of State,
sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary General in 2002 informing the U.N.
that the U.S. did not intend to become a party to the Rome
Statute—this became known as the U.S. “unsigning” of the Rome

25.

Carol Morello, U.S. Withdraws from U.N. Human Rights Council over
Perceived Bias against Israel, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expected-toback-away-from-un-human-rights-council/2018/06/19/a49c2d0c-733c-11e8b4b7308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.d3cdfc76baf8 [https://perma.cc
/Z95J-C7AN].

26.

Goldsmith, supra note 19.

27.

John Bolton, National Security Adviser, Nat. Sec’y Council, Address to the
Federalist Society at the Mayflower Hotel: Protecting American
Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats (Sept. 10,
2018).

28.

See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 529, 532-33 (1999).

29.

Clinton Administration: 1993-2001, AMICC, https://www.amicc.org/
clinton-administration (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ Q8D27WT2].
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Statute. 30 Ambassador Bolton reportedly said that this was the
“happiest day of his life.” 31
In its second term, the Bush
administration adopted a more pragmatic approach to the ICC.
While continuing to dispute ICC jurisdiction over Americans, it
agreed to the U.N. Security Council resolution referring the Darfur
genocide for investigation by the ICC and President George W. Bush
waived restrictions on counterterrorism assistance to many ICC
members after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly remarked
in 2006 that the restrictions were like “shooting ourselves in the
foot.” 32 During its eight years, the Obama administration continued
the Bush administration’s pragmatic approach to the ICC, offering
assistance to the ICC for certain investigations while continuing to
dispute the ICC’s jurisdiction over Americans. 33
Somewhat surprisingly, given historic opposition among
conservative Republicans towards the ICC, the Trump administration
did not criticize the ICC for its first twenty months. 34 This quiet was
all the more surprising because the ICC Prosecutor had recommended
in December 2017 that the ICC’s pre-trial chamber authorize the
initiation of an investigation of United States’ treatment of detainees
in Afghanistan and also at CIA facilities in Europe. 35 A decision by

30.

See Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, To Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General
(May 6, 2002) (on file the U.S. Department of State) (discussing the United
States’ request not to become a party to the Rome Statute).

31.

Ruth Wedgwood & Morton H. Halperin, Will the Real John Bolton Please
Stand Up?, FOREIGN POLICY (July 15, 2005, 12:00 AM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2005/07/15/will-the-real-john-bolton-pleasestand-up/ [https://perma.cc /NQA2-YHTX]

32.

Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Rethinks Its Cutoff of Military Aid to Latin
TIMES
(Mar.
12,
2006),
American
Nations,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/politics/us-rethinks-its-cutoff-ofmilitary-aid-to-latin-american-nations.html?mtrref=www.google.
com&gwh=75EE3026BD61F7B8FA0553B7F6B8741E&gwt=pay
[https://perma.cc/H77V-JVEV].

33.

Caitlin Lambert, The Evolving US Policy Towards the ICC, INT’L JUSTICE
PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.international justiceproject.com/theevolving-us-policy-towards-the-icc/ [https:// perma.cc/N9L7-GCKS].

34.

See John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Throws Down the Gauntlet
to the ICC. The Court Should Decline The Challenge, LAWFARE (Sept. 10,
2018, 11:50 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com /trump-administrationthrows-down-gauntlet-icc-court-should-decline-challenge
[https://perma.cc/8ZZ5-25TQ] (discussing the Trump administration’s
seizure of cooperation with the ICC while the court is investigating U.S.
officials).

35.

Id.
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the pre-trial chamber is expected at any time. 36
Administration
officials have been aware of the Prosecutor’s recommendation but
made no public comment about it for ten months.
That silence changed on September 10, 2018 when Ambassador
Bolton fired a broadside at the International Criminal Court, which
he called “ineffective,” “unaccountable,” “deeply flawed,” and
“outright dangerous.” 37 He said the ICC unacceptably threatens
American sovereignty and U.S. national-security interests. 38 He
criticized the ICC Prosecutor’s request to start an investigation of
U.S. officials for detainee abuses in Afghanistan and elsewhere as
“utterly unfounded” and “unjustifiable.” 39 He said that the United
States will “use any means necessary to protect our citizens and those
of our allies from unjust prosecution by this illegitimate court.”40
Specifically, the United States will not cooperate with the ICC and
will provide no assistance to the court. 41 And if the ICC “comes after
the United States,” he said, the U.S. will “fight back” by banning its
judges and prosecutors from entering the United States, freezing their
assets, and prosecuting them in the U.S. criminal justice system.42
The U.S. will do the same for “any company or state that assists an
ICC investigation of Americans.” 43 He also said the U.S. would
negotiate more binding non-surrender agreements and take steps in
the U.N. Security Council to constrain the ICC. 44
Unfortunately, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, invited this
attack by asking the court to open a criminal investigation of U.S.
officials. 45 No American administration, Republican or Democratic,

36.

The ICC rejected the request on April 12, 2019. See Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into
the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17, INT’L
CRIM.
CT. (Apr.
12,
2019),
available
at
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF. In a statement issued that day,
the White House declared this decision “a major international victory.” See
Statement from the President, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 12, 2019), available
at https://www.whitehouse.gov /briefings-statements/statement-from-thepresident-8/.

37.

Bolton, supra note 30.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

See ICC Prosecutor Seeks Afghanistan War Crimes Investigation, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41864315
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would fail to respond to an actual or threatened criminal investigation
of U.S. military personnel and officials or fail to warn the court about
the consequences of such an investigation. And 2018 is an election
year, so this was an easy softball for the Trump administration to hit.
Remember that in 2002—another election year—a majority of
Democrats, including John Kerry and Hillary Clinton, voted for the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which prohibited
cooperation with the ICC (with certain exceptions), cut off financial
assistance to countries that did not agree to non-surrender
agreements, and preemptively authorized the use of military force
(yes, an AUMF!) to free Americans held in The Hague. 46
Of course, it is unfortunate that the Trump administration seems
to have decided that, whether the court opens an investigation of U.S.
officials or not, the U.S. will cease all cooperation with the ICC,
reversing twelve years of cooperation that started when I was Legal
Adviser during the Bush administration and continued through the
Obama administration. But it is hard to imagine any administration
would continue to cooperate with the court while it was investigating
U.S. officials.
Ambassador Bolton’s other threats against the ICC go much
further and seem unlikely to be implemented. It would be an
extraordinary stretch of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, or IEEPA, to declare that the ICC presented a “national
emergency” justifying the blocking of the assets of its judges and
prosecutors. And I am not aware of any federal criminal statute that
could be used to charge ICC judges or prosecutors, much less
companies or foreign governments that cooperate with the court.
The Trump administration has thrown down the gauntlet and
challenged the ICC judges to go forward with the Afghan
investigation. 47 I can imagine that many of the judges will want to
double down and not be cowed by the Trump administration’s
threats. While this might make some judges feel good, it would be
counterproductive and would only hurt the court and the cause of
international justice in the long run. Few people believe the
prosecutor could conduct a successful trial of U.S. officials, and any
investigation of the U.S. would result in a cutoff of U.S. intelligence,
diplomatic and military assistance to the court, and enormous
[http://perma.cc/A59C-KES7] (discussing Fatou Bensouda’s request to seek
a formal investigation into alleged war crimes committed in Afghanistan).
46.

Bellinger, supra note 34; American Service-Members’ Protection Act. 116
Stat. 820 (2002) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 7421).

47.

Steve Holland, Trump Administration Takes Aim at International Criminal
Court, PLO, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2018 11:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-trump-icc/trump-administration-takes-aim-at-internationalcriminal-court-plo-idUSKCN1LQ076 [http://perma.cc/ZQE8-7RDH].
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pressure on U.S. allies not to cooperate. 48 There would be significant
cost to the ICC, for little gain.
Rather than accept the Trump administration’s challenge, the
court would be wise not to act precipitously. Rather than approve the
opening of the investigation requested by the prosecutor, it could
quietly ask the U.S. for more information about the numerous
investigations of detainee abuse the United States has already
conducted. Even if the Trump administration chooses not to provide
this information, the ICC might well decide that its limited resources
are better directed towards investigating war crimes and crimes
against humanity that are of “sufficient gravity” to justify the court’s
attention, as the Rome Statute requires. 49
International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICC is not the only international court that pose challenges
for the Trump administration. The Trump administration is facing
three cases filed against the United States in the International Court
of Justice—two lawsuits filed by Iran and one filed by the “State of
Palestine.” 50 The two suits filed by Iran allege violations of the 1955
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between
the US and Iran. 51 The first case was filed in June 2016—during the
Obama administration—and alleges that the U.S. violated the Treaty
by seizing Iran’s Central Bank assets to pay a terrorism judgment.52
Iran brought the case after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Bank
Markazi case that it did not violate the FSIA or international law for
the judgment holders to attach the Central Bank assets. 53 The
United States has filed a response arguing that the ICJ does not have
jurisdiction, and an initial hearing is scheduled for next month.54
48.

Bellinger, supra note 34.

49.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(d), July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3.

50.

Pending Cases, INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE (last visited October 29, 2018),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pending-cases [http://perma.cc/G66G-8FHR].

51.

Press Release, International Court of Justice, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran
v. U.S.) (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/164/16420181012-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/VPH7-C88T]; Press Release,
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.) INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181016-PRE-01-00EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/GP7Z-THSH].

52.

Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.),
2016 I.C.J. Pleadings 164 at 6 (June 14, 2016).

53.

Id. at 26.

54.

Preliminary Objections Submitted by the United States of America, Certain
Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), at 47 (May 1, 2017). The ICJ issued its
Judgment on Preliminary Objections on February 13, 2019.
In its
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More recently, Iran filed a second case against the United States in
July 2018, alleging that the United States had also violated the
Treaty of Amity by terminating the Iran nuclear deal and reimposing
sanctions on Iran. 55
Two months later, in September 2018, the
“State of Palestine” filed an action against the United States claiming
that the U.S. violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations by moving its embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. 56
On October 3, the ICJ issued an opinion unanimously approving
“provisional measures” directing the United States to remove
impediments on the export to Iran of medicine and medical devices,
foodstuffs and agricultural commodities, and spare parts and
equipment necessary for the safety of civil aviation. 57 Although the
decision was a small (and probably temporary) legal victory for Iran,
the ICJ rejected Iran’s far-reaching request that the Court order the
United States not to reimpose the economic sanctions lifted by the
JCPOA or to impose any new sanctions on Iran. 58
The Trump administration has responded quickly and vigorously
to the ICJ’s provisional measure order as well as to the Palestinian
action. On October 3, the same day the ICJ announced its provisional
measures decision, the Trump administration announced that it would
withdraw from both the Treaty of Amity with Iran, under which the
two cases by Iran were filed, and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 59 In announcing the

judgment, the Court rejected certain of the preliminary objections raised by
the United States, while accepting one of the objections to jurisdiction
raised by the United States. The Court thus determined that it has
jurisdiction over the dispute, except over Iran’s claim of an alleged violation
of sovereign immunity under customary international law. See generally
Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.)
(Feb. 13, 2019).
55.

Application Instituting Proceedings, Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.) (July 16,
2018).

56.

Application Instituting Proceedings, Relocation of the United States
Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.) (Sept. 28, 2018).

57.

Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures, 2018 I.C.J. 175 at 28 (Oct. 3).

58.

Id.

59.

U.S. Terminates 1955 ‘Friendship’ Treaty With Iran After UN Court
Ruling, RFERL (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.rferl.org /a/u-s-terminates1955-friendship-treaty-with-iran-after-un-court-ruling/29523774.html
[http://perma.cc/BVQ8-2PM6].
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withdrawals, Ambassador Bolton stated, “The United States will not
sit idly by as baseless, politicized claims are brought against us.” 60
The Trump Administration was right to withdraw from the
Treaty of Amity. Notwithstanding the severing of U.S. diplomatic
relations with Iran after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 1979,
U.S. policy has always been to try to separate U.S. friendship and
support for the Iranian people from U.S. dislike of Iranian government
policies. 61 Hence, it made sense for the U.S. to try to remain in the
Treaty in order to emphasize U.S. respect for the Iranian people and
to ensure the rights of Americans in Iran. However, the Iranian
government has now relied on the treaty to sue the United States in
the ICJ three times, first in 1992 in the Oil Platforms case (which
Iran filed after U.S. forces attacked Iranian oil rigs that had been used
to mine the Persian Gulf), 62 then in 2016 in the Certain Iranian
Assets case (which Iran filed after the U.S. allowed the attachment of
Iranian assets to pay terrorism judgments), 63 and again in July 2018
in the Nuclear Sanctions case. 64 The United States probably should
have withdrawn from the Treaty in 1992 when the Oil Platforms case
was filed, or at least in 1996 after the Court concluded that it had
jurisdiction to hear the case over U.S. objections. 65 In any event, given
the Iranian government’s continued reliance on the Treaty as an
instrument of lawfare, it is legally prudent—although Secretary
Pompeo might have acknowledged that it is “regrettable”— that the
U.S. withdraw from the Treaty.
In contrast, it was unnecessary and potentially counterproductive
for the Trump administration to withdraw from the Optional Protocol
to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR).
60.

Roberta Rampton et al., U.S. Withdraws from International Accords, says
U.N. World Court ‘Politicized,’ REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018 1:35 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty/u-s-reviewingagreements-that-expose-it-to-world-court-boltonidUSKCN1MD2CP?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_ source
=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2F
worldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%29 [http://perma.cc/J5RB-VKH8].

61.

See generally Iran, the United States and a Political Seesaw, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
11,
2012),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2012/04/07/world/middleeast/iran-timeline.html#/#time5_
210 [http://perma.cc/9NF6-PMR9] (demonstrating the timeline of the IranU.S. relationship which states “Far from a monolithic relationship, Iran and
the United States have spent as many decades as friends as they have as
enemies.”).

62.

Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12).

63.

Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 54.

64.

Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 57, at 18 (holding the U.S.
should terminate its new “May 8” sanctions against Iran).

65.

Oil Platforms, supra note 62.
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Ambassador Bolton stated that the withdrawal was “consistent with”
the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) in 2005 (when
I was Legal Adviser). 66 However, the two situations are very different.
The Bush administration decided to withdraw from the Optional
Protocol to the VCCR only after it had been sued three times before
the ICJ (by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico) for the failure of state
and local law enforcement officials to provide consular notice to
foreign nationals arrested in the United States and after the ICJ had
ruled against the United States in two of the three cases (LaGrand67
in 2001 and Avena 68 in 2004—Paraguay discontinued its case in
1998). 69 In 2005, upon the recommendation of Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and following lengthy interagency discussions,
President Bush ordered U.S. states to comply with the ICJ’s ruling in
the Avena case (which required the U.S. to review the convictions and
death sentences of fifty-one Mexican nationals who had not been
given consular notice at the time of their arrest) but determined that
the U.S. would withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR to
prevent
further
cases
against
the
United
States
for
inadvertent failures by local officials to provide consular notice. 70 In
contrast, there has been no pattern and practice of other governments
suing (much less prevailing against) the United States in the ICJ for
violations of the VCDR. Moreover, the United States will have very
strong arguments to defend in the case filed by Palestine and is very
likely to win. Hence, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol appears
to be an overreaction, motivated more by ideological dislike of the
ICJ (which John Bolton called “politicized and ineffective”) 71 than by
any real legal necessity. Withdrawing from the VCDR Optional
Protocol also means that the United States will give up its own right
to sue other states if they violate their VCDR obligations to the
United States. (For example, the U.S. successfully sued Iran in the
ICJ in 1980 for violations of both the VCDR and VCCR for seizing
the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding American diplomats
66.

Rampton, supra note 60.

67.

LaGrand (Ger. V. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).

68.

Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).

69.

Case Concerning The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Par. v.
U.S.), Order, 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10).

70.

Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/ politics/ussays-it-has-withdrawn-from-world-judicial-body.html
[https://perma.cc/VNF4-6PF2].

71.

Rampton, supra note 62.
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hostage. 72) In sum, for reasons that appear to be purely speculative
(in contrast to the reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from the VCCR
Optional Protocol), the Trump administration is depriving future U.S.
presidents of a valuable legal tool to defend U.S. diplomats and
embassies.
Going forward, the issue to watch in the two Iran cases is what
the Trump administration will do if the Court rules in favor of Iran
again, such as by concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the cases
or ordering the return of Iran’s Central Bank assets. Currently, the
Trump administration has permitted the State Department to treat
these cases seriously and defend them vigorously, just as the State
Department did during the Bush administration when Iran sued the
United States in the Oil Platforms case and Mexico sued the U.S. in
the Avena case. 73
But if the Court were to conclude, over strong U.S. objections,
that it has jurisdiction to hear these new Iran cases, it is possible that
the Administration might decide that the U.S. will not continue to
appear for the merits phases of the cases. This would, of course, be
just what the Reagan administration did in the Nicaragua case in
1981, when the U.S. withdrew from the case after the Court ruled
that it had jurisdiction. 74 Ambassador Bolton cited the Reagan
administration’s action approvingly when he announced the U.S.
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the VCDR. 75
The
Nicaragua withdrawal has damaged the reputation of the U.S. for
respect for international law to this day. 76 A withdrawal from the
two Iran cases might be popular with some critics of international
courts, but it would further damage the reputation of the United
States as a country committed to international law. It would also
make it virtually impossible for the United States to criticize China,

72.

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).

73.

See Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On U.S.
Appearance Before the International Court of Justice (Aug. 27, 2018)
(stating the U.S. State Department “will vigorously defend against Iran’s
meritless claims this week in The Hague, and we will continue to work with
our allies to counter the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities in the
region...that threaten international peace and stability.”).

74.

Paul Lewis, World Court Supports Nicaragua After U.S. Rejected Judges
Role, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/
1986/06/28/world/world-court-supports-nicaragua-after-us-rejected-judgesrole.html [http://perma.cc/27KK-AAP4].

75.

White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?452479-1/white-house-president-stating-facts-mockingchristine-blasey-ford&start=216 [perma.cc/96VH-ZTTW].

76.

Paul Lewis, supra note 76.
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or any other country, that refuses to appear before an international
tribunal.
The case filed against the United States by the “State of
Palestine” is even more specious than the two cases filed by Iran.
First, it is questionable whether Palestine qualifies as a “state” with
standing to file a claim with the ICJ. Even it does, it is dubious that
the transfer of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem would be considered by
the Court to raise an issue of interpretation or application of the
VCDR. Although the Trump administration is right to consider the
case to be baseless and an abuse of the ICJ, the Administration
should still appear and make its arguments rather than refuse to
appear. If the Administration appears, it is likely to win, most likely
at the jurisdictional stage, and to be credited for respect for
international dispute settlement. In contrast, if the Administration
were to refuse to appear, even in a baseless case, the United States
would be criticized for disrespect for international courts.

Treaties and International Agreements
Let me turn to the Trump administration’s approach to treaties
and international agreements more generally.
Richard Haass, the
President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has said that if there is
a defining doctrine so far of the Trump administration, it is the
“withdrawal doctrine.” 77
The President has withdrawn from the
TPP, the Paris Climate Change Accord, and the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action. 78
He has also threatened to withdraw 79 from
80
NAFTA, the WTO, the Korea-U.S. Trade Agreement, 81 and even
the North Atlantic Treaty.
77.

Richard N. Haass (@RichardHaass), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2017 6:40 AM),
https://twitter.com/RichardHaass/status/918471381511229440?ref
_src=twsrc%5Etfw [https://perma.cc/2NNR-YTQU].

78.

Dudar & Shesgreen, supra note 9.

79.

Id.; Everything Donald Trump Has Threatened to Quit, THE WEEK (Aug.
31, 2018), https://www.theweek.co.uk /96192/everything-donald-trumphas-threatened-to-quit [perma.cc/97C6-Y3F4] (observing that Trump’s
threats to withdraw from the WTO and NATO are, so far, only threats);
Jim Tankersley, Trump Signs Revised Korean Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/09/24/us/politics/southkorea-trump-trade-deal.html [https:// perma.cc/83XM-YW82] (discussing
Trump’s renegotiated Korea-U.S. Trade Agreement).

80.

The Trump Administration resolved to renegotiate NAFTA in a purported
effort to improve upon its terms. The United States, Mexico, and Canada
signed the renamed “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” on
November 30, 2018. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” (last visited Apr. 14, 2019),
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-statesmexico-canada-agreement.
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It seems clear that President Trump dislikes large multilateral
agreements.
Although he sees himself as a dealmaker, he prefers
bilateral agreements, which allow the United States to be more
transactional—to get something in return. 82
The question that bears watching is whether the President and
his administration will take broader aim at other multilateral
agreements and even bilateral treaties.
There is at least some reason to be concerned.
At the very
beginning of the Administration, a draft Executive Order entitled
“Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties” was leaked to the New
York Times. 83 The draft order expressed concern about a perceived
“proliferation of multilateral treaties that purport to regulate
activities that are domestic in nature.” 84 The order cited as examples
the CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(although the U.S. is not a party to either treaty). 85
The order
stated that these treaties are not appropriate matters for international
agreements and instead can be used to force countries “to adhere to
often radical domestic agendas.” 86 Ostensibly to prevent the United
States from becoming party to such treaties, the order would have
created a Cabinet-level “Treaty Review Committee” to review all
multilateral treaties which the United States was currently involved
in negotiating or had already joined, and to recommend to the
81.

President Trump signed a modified version of the Korea-U.S. Trade
Agreement on September 24, 2018. See Jim Tankersley, Trump Signs
Revised Korean Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/us/politics/south-korea-trumptrade-deal.html.

82.

See Harry Broadman, Trump’s Misplaced Penchant For Bilateral Trade
Deals, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2018, 10:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/harrybroadman/2018/01/31/trumps-misplaced-penchant-for-bilateraltrade-deals/#e31a02d57b95 [https://perma.cc/342V-KERU] (discussing
Trump’s preference for bilateral treaties over multilateral treaties).

83.

Max Fisher, Trump Prepares Orders Aiming at Global Funding and
Treaties, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/01/25/us/politics/united-nations-trump-administration.html
[https://perma.cc/RL4G-3XWJ].

84.

Draft Executive Order, The White House, Moratorium on New Multilateral
Treaties, available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3424628
/Read-the-Trump-administration-s-draft-of-the.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NKK-T6L5] (unpublished).

85.

Id.; see Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature Oct. 6, 1999,
2131 U.N.T.S. 83 (showing that the U.S. has neither signed nor ratified the
CEDAW); see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for
signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, (showing that the U.S. has signed
but not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child).

86.

Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties, supra note 84.
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President whether the United States should cease participation in
negotiations or refuse to sign, or to withdraw from certain treaties to
which the U.S. was already a party. 87
Although this executive order was never signed, it obviously did
reflect the view of at least some White House staff that prior
administrations had engaged and potentially become party to
multilateral treaties that were not appropriate. Ironically, the two
treaties it cited as examples of concern—the CEDAW and the Rights
of the Child—the United States has never joined. 88 It also reflected a
lack of understanding of the treaty-making process, in which the
Secretary of State and ultimately the White House seek interagency
approval before the United States begins negotiating or transmits any
treaty to the Senate. 89 And even if this executive order was never
signed, the question remains whether the Administration is engaged in
any quieter internal review to determine whether it should withdraw
from other multilateral treaties. In October, for example, when
Ambassador Bolton announced that the United States would
withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, he also said that the Trump administration
would “commence a review of all international agreements that may
still expose the United States to purported binding jurisdiction,
dispute resolution in the International Court of Justice.” 90
And with respect to treaties more generally, it is important to
note that during the last twenty months, President Trump has
transmitted only one new treaty to the Senate, and has not ratified
any treaties approved by the Senate. 91 The State Department has

87.

Id.

88.

Id.; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, supra note 85; Convention on the Rights of
the Child, supra note 85.

89.

Jonathan B. Tucker, Interagency Bargaining and International Negotiation:
Lessons from the Open Skies Treaty Talks, 12 NEGOT. J. 275, 276 (1996).

90.

Rampton, supra note 60.

91.

See Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴛ. ᴏf Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/
[https://perma.cc/
78AH5WWB] (listing only one treaty that has been submitted to the Senate
since President Trump took office on January 20, 2017); see also Treaties
Approved
by
the
Senate
During
the
115th
Congress,
CONGRESS.GOV,https://www.congress.gov/search?q=%7B%22source%22%3
A%22treaties%22%2C%22congress%22%3A%22115%22%2C%22treatystatus%22%3A%22Approved%22%7D [https://perma.cc/N568-GM2X] (last
visited Jan. 26, 2018) (listing six treaties that have been approved by the
Senate since President Trump took office on January 20, 2017); see also
2018
Treaties
and
Agreements,
U.S.
Dᴇᴘᴛ.
ᴏf
Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ,
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/c78676.htm
[https://perma.cc
/L4ZQ-GSH8] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (listing all the treaties that were
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not submitted a Treaty Priority List, which administrations generally
submit to the Senate within the first 6-9 months to inform the Senate
which treaties pending before the Senate the administration
supports. 92 In the last twenty months, the Senate has approved six
treaties, 93 but President Trump has not ratified any of them. 94
By way of comparison, during President Bush’s first two years in
office, the Senate approved twenty treaties, 95 during his next two
years the Senate approved an additional thirty-three treaties, 96 and in
his second term while I was Legal Adviser, the Senate approved an
additional 110 treaties, 97 for a total of 163 treaties approved by the
Senate during President Bush’s eight years in office.
By way of
further comparison, during President Obama’s eight years in office,
the Senate approved only twenty treaties. 98
So, the key issues that bear watching with respect to treaties and
international agreements are whether President Trump will withdraw
from any more Senate-approved treaties, and whether he will end up
with the worst treaty record by the numbers of any recent president.

Human Rights
I want to end with a few observations about the Administration’s
approach to human rights.
Unfortunately, the cold truth is that neither President Trump nor
any senior member of his administration appear to care about
international human rights or the historic U.S. role as a leader and
ratified by the U.S. in 2018 and none of the six treaties that the Senate has
approved since Trump took office are on the list).
92.

Curtis Bradley et al., The Death of Article II Treaties?, LAWFARE (Dec. 13,
2018)
https://www.lawfareblog.com/death-article-ii-treaties
[https://
perma.cc/M2CK-72MD].

93.

The Senate has since ratified the U.N. Convention on the Assignment of
Receivables in International Trade, bringing the total to seven treaties. See
U.N. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade,
U.S. Congress (last visited Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.congress.gov
/treaty-document/114th-congress/7?r=14&s =1.

94.

Treaties Approved by the Senate During the 115th Congress, supra note 91;
2018 Treaties and Agreements, supra note 91.

95.

John Bellinger, Senate Approves Two More Treaties, Bringing Obama
Administration’s Treaty Record to Fifteen, LAWFARE (July 16, 2016)
https://www.lawfareblog.com/senate-approves-two-more-treaties-bringingobama-administrations-treaty-record-fifteen
[https://perma.cc/56DHNURP].

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

John B. Bellinger III, International Law and the Foreign Affairs Challenges
for the Next Administration, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 909, 917 (2017).
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advocate on human rights issues.
The President has repeatedly
praised authoritarian leaders and human rights abusers like Putin,
Duterte, and Kim Jung-un. 99 He went so far as to say that Kim
Jung-un—perhaps the most notorious human rights abuser in the
world—”loves his people.” 100
The only time I am aware that
President Trump has personally raised human rights concerns is when
he tweeted in December 2017 that he would be watching for “human
rights violations” by the Iranian Government, a tweet that seemed to
be motivated more by enmity towards Iran than concern about
human rights. 101
The Administration’s National Security Strategy, issued last
December, does not mention promoting human rights as a goal.102
The strategy commits the Administration to support individual
dignity, freedom, and the rule of law. 103 Such good things, however,
are cast as “American values,” rather than rights to which all people
are entitled. 104 The strategy does make several references to individual
rights but the term “human rights” appears just once to warn that
the United States will deny admission to “human rights
abusers.” 105 The Strategy goes out of its way to emphasize that “[w]e
are not going to impose our values on others.” 106 In other words, U.S.
human rights policy will be only to lead by example and not to
promote human rights in other countries.
This is not only a sharp
departure from the bipartisan commitment to human rights
promotion in previous administrations, both Republican and
Democratic, but it is hard to see that the U.S. sets a positive example
for the rest of the world when the President imposes a travel ban on
99.

Calamur, supra note 15.

100. Maegan Vazquez, Trump Says Accused Human Rights Abuser Kim Jong Un
‘Loves His People,’ CNN (June 12, 2018, 11:09 AM ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-unloves-his-people/index.html [https://perma.cc/AC9E-2NU6].
101. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2017, 5:03
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/947453152806297600?
ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E9474531
52806297600&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2017%2F12%2F
30%2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-iran-protests%2Findex.html
[https://perma.cc/2FNY-VPKQ].
102. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (Dec. 2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
[https://perma.cc/USM7-AVZ3].
103. Id. at 42.
104. Id. at 41.
105. Id. at 1, 38, 42.
106. Id. at 37.
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nationals from Muslim countries, 107 attacks the free press, 108 and
encourages racial tensions. 109
And, of course, the Administration withdrew from U.S.
participation in the Human Rights Council earlier this year.110
Although this is not necessarily evidence of a disregard for human
rights—the Bush administration chose not to join the Human Rights
Council when it was established 111—the Trump administration’s
withdrawal seemed to be motivated more by domestic political
considerations than a desire to advance human rights more
generally. 112
In short, the Trump administration has abandoned the traditional
U.S. role as a leader in promoting international human rights.
Bipartisan support for human rights remains strong in Congress, and
career officials will continue their efforts, but it is hard for the U.S. to
lead with any credibility, given the tweets and actions of the
President.

Conclusion
In sum, it is still too early to tell whether we are witnessing the
“greatest presidential onslaught on international law and international
107. Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,
82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017) (executive order effective Jan. 27, 2017).
108. See, e.g., James Doubek, Hundreds Of Newspapers Denounce Trump’s
Attacks On Media In Coordinated Editorials, NPR (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/639125774/hundreds-of-newspapersdenounce-trumps-attacks-on-media-in-coordinated-editorial
[https://perma.cc/YEZ5-ZYWZ].
109. See, e.g., Julie Pace, Steve Peoples, & Zeke Miller, Analysis: One Year On,
Trump Still Fuels Racial Divide, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 11,
2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/louisiana /articles/201808-11/trump-still-fuels-racial-divide-a-year-after-charlottesville
[https://perma.cc/H9UJ-FYCQ].
110. President Donald J. Trump is Standing Up for Human Rights at the U.N.,
THE WHITE HOUSE (June 21, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-standing-human-rights-u-n/
[https://perma.cc/U7ET-LBTX].
111. Michelle Kelemen, Bush Administration Won’t Join Human Rights Council,
NPR (Apr. 7, 2006), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.
php?storyId=5330109 [https://perma.cc/F2T9-79K4].
112. See Will Gore, The US Has a Point Leaving the UN Human Rights Council,
Even If Donald Trump’s Reasoning Is Flawed, INDEPENDENT (June 20,
2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/usa-donald-trump-un-humanrights-council-israel-a8407941.html [https://perma.cc/GPN2-FW7N] (“The
withdrawal surely has much more to do with an ideological distaste for
multilateral engagement than a belief that the body is beyond repair – it’s
another symbol of the America First policy Trump campaigned on.”).
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institutions in American history.” 113 But the warning signs may be
there, starting with Ambassador Bolton’s fierce attack on the ICC
and the Administration’s subsequent withdrawal from the Treaty of
Amity with Iran and the Optional Protocol to the VCDR.
Ambassador Bolton’s speech on Monday114 reflects a much more
aggressive stance by the Trump administration towards international
law and institutions, and there may be more to come.
A potential ray of light is that most of the senior Administration
lawyers, including the State Department Legal Adviser, are
reasonably centrist lawyers who served in the Bush administration
and do not appear to be personally hostile towards international
law. 115 But they may have limited ability to steer the
Administration’s international law agenda if it is set by the President
and the National Security Advisor.
I do want to end with an appeal to the law students in the room.
I hope that the current turbulence in our government does not deter
you from entering public service.
Although disconcerting and
distracting, most of this turbulence is taking place at the White
House and the higher political levels. The government still needs
talented lawyers at the State Department, Justice Department,
Defense Department, Treasury Department, and elsewhere.
Our
institutions remain strong, but they can only remain strong if talented
people continue to serve. So my plea to you is this: Please do not be
deterred. There are plenty of interesting international law jobs in
the U.S. Government and your government needs you. Please serve.

113. Goldsmith, supra note 19.
114. Bolton, supra note 27.
115. See John Bellinger, Jennifer Newstead Nominated to Be State Department
Legal Adviser, LAWFARE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/jennifer-newstead-nominated-be-state-department-legal-adviser
[https://perma.cc/W8G9-T34G] (discussing State Department Legal
Adviser Jennifer Newstead and other Trump Administration lawyers).
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